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STAKEHOLDER MOBILISATION AND SPORTS STADIUM REGENERATION: ANTECEDENT FACTORS
UNDERPINNING THE FORMATION OF THE OUR TOTTENHAM COMMUNITY NETWORK

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ABSTRACT

Research question: Within sport management, there is a lack of empirical research on the reasons why stakeholders mobilise. This article identifies four antecedent factors underpinning the formation of the *Our Tottenham* community network: a network formed by community groups in Tottenham to challenge, inter-alia, the stadium-led regeneration scheme.

Research methods: The research draws on a longitudinal, qualitative case study, involving interviews, participant observation of community meetings, and analysis of documents.

Results and Findings: Four factors underpinned the development of the *Our Tottenham* community network. The erosion of local democracy and the violation of reciprocity are categorised as reactive forces, in which mobilisation occurred as a response to the behaviour of the Council and the football club. Protecting community interests and increasing salience were driven more by the needs of the community and are categorised as proactive forces underpinning mobilisation.

Implications: In the context of this case study, we argue that mobilising efforts occurred due to the presence of both reactive and proactive forces. This helped the *Our Tottenham* network to build a salient stakeholder coalition. The findings also suggest that focal organisations need to recognise how their behaviour can create the antecedent conditions for stakeholder mobilisation and put in place structures that enable community stakeholders to have a voice during stadium-led regeneration.

Keywords (5): Community, mobilisation, regeneration, sport, stakeholder.

INTRODUCTION

Stakeholder theory has a long and rich history in management and organisation studies (Laplume et al, 2008). It has also been used as a framework in many studies within sport management (e.g. Castro-Martinez & Jackson, 2015; Friedman & Mason, 2004; Leopkey & Parent, 2009). While this is due in part to the 'emotional resonance' of the stakeholder concept (Laplume et al, 2008, p.1153), it is also due to the way sport is embedded in social relations (Breitbarth & Harris, 2008: p.184). This reinforces the expectation that sport organisations, which often emphasise their community links, should engage seriously with their various stakeholders. However, as will be seen in this article, this is not always the case and this in turn can lead to the mobilisation of groups of stakeholders.

Mainstream stakeholder literature tends to focus on how firms identify, balance and manage the different interests of stakeholder groups (Laplume et al, 2008). However, there is one specific strand of research that seeks to understand stakeholder actions and responses and in particular how stakeholder networks seek to influence firms (e.g. Frooman, 1999). One of the key tenets of this body of research is that when stakeholder groups combine - stakeholder mobilisation - their collective influence on a firm is greater than their individual claims (Neville & Menguc, 2006). Given the prioritisation of private sector interests over citizenship and community interests (Warner and Clifton, 2014), the mobilisation of local stakeholders is arguably more important now than previously. However, Hayibor and Collins (2016, p.351) state that 'the conditions that predispose stakeholders to act against firms remain largely unexplored in the literature'.

There is little empirical research that seeks to understand stakeholder mobilisation in sport management. Although there has been some examination of civic campaigns in relation to sporting mega-events such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa (Cornelissen, 2012) and the 2007 Pan American Games in Rio de Janeiro (Curi et al., 2011), there is limited theoretical understanding of the

factors that lead stakeholders to mobilise together with a lack of empirical research on how stakeholder networks initially come together, why they come together, and the extent to which these networks are able to influence a firm.

This article seeks to identify the antecedent factors underpinning stakeholder mobilisation in the context of stadium-led regeneration, taking place in Tottenham. Sport-led regeneration schemes have the potential to alienate and marginalise community stakeholders (e.g. Golubchikov, 2017; Gray and Porter, 2015; Watt, 2013). To date, however, there is a lack of research on how community stakeholders *respond* to these developments and in particular on community stakeholder mobilisation. The article draws on a longitudinal empirical case study of the *Our Tottenham* network that formed in 2013. The network provided a mechanism through which local community groups in Tottenham were able to act in a coordinated manner to voice their opinions towards the planned changes brought about by the regeneration plans, with the new stadium for Tottenham Hotspur football club central to these.

The article makes four contributions. First, it addresses the lack of empirical understanding of the antecedent factors that underpin stakeholder mobilisation in the context of stadium-led regeneration. Four factors are identified and categorised as either reactive or proactive forces. Second, it demonstrates the importance that ‘interest intensity’ plays in mobilisation (Rowley & Moldovaneau, 2003), although we argue that the longer-term sustainability of this network relates to interest intensity *and* to social identity. Third, it shows in detail how both reactive and proactive forces help groups to build a salient stakeholder coalition. Fourth, it highlights that there are both instrumental and normative reasons for councils and private sector developers to enable community stakeholders to have a voice during the process of stadium-led regeneration.

STAKEHOLDER MOBILISATION

Stakeholder activism involves various groups of stakeholders getting together to place pressure on, or influence organisations. Research, however, tends to focus on the concept of stakeholder networks from a focal organisation's perspective. Rowley (1997), for example, argues that organisations do not respond to each stakeholder individually, but to the interaction of multiple influences from the entire stakeholder network. Frooman (1999) argues that stakeholder power can be determined by the nature of dependency and that the direction and extent of dependency determines the power advantage within a particular firm–stakeholder relationship. Specifically, a firm is more able to resist stakeholder pressures when it is a central player in its stakeholder network, when its stakeholder networks are less densely interconnected, and when there is low interdependence and firm power. Conversely, the existence of a dense stakeholder network can facilitate the formation of coalitions and densely tied stakeholder networks can constrain firms through creating the capacity to monitor organisations more efficiently and more effectively communicating information (Neville & Menguc, 2006). Peachey and Bruening (2011) demonstrate this effect through their research on organisational change in a Division I, Football Championship Subdivision athletic department in the US. Powerful alumni with dense networks successfully opposed the decision to discontinue the football programme through their mobilising efforts.

While previous researchers have focused on how firms manage the different interests of stakeholder groups, others, such as Parmar et al. (2010), argue that stakeholder mobilisation needs to be understood from the point of view of those stakeholders involved in forming a coalition. This supports a fundamental question raised by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003, p.204), namely 'when do stakeholder groups take action?' They argue that previous literature fails to explore the antecedent conditions that lead to stakeholder group mobilisation. Subsequent research also argues the need for further research on stakeholder alliances and more understanding of why members come together (Butterfield et al., 2004, Hayibor and Collins, 2016).

Hayibor and Collins (2016) argue there are a number of predictors of stakeholder mobilisation against a firm, with perceptions of fairness, or the degree of reciprocity between stakeholders and a firm the most widely cited reasons. This links with one of the key tenets of stakeholder management, which is the need to balance the multiple, conflicting demands of a wide range of stakeholders. If a particular stakeholder feels that they have been treated unfairly by a focal organisation and that the focal organisation is violating the fairness norms of reciprocity (Hayibor & Collins, 2016) then that particular stakeholder may seek to act against the firm. When there are sufficient numbers of stakeholders that feel a focal organisation is in violation of this fairness norm, this provides the impetus for stakeholders to mobilise to increase the strength of their response towards the firm (Neville & Menguc, 2006). However, as King argues (2008, p.27), 'dissatisfaction does not automatically translate into the emergence of a salient stakeholder group'; there needs to be some degree of shared interest amongst stakeholders (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Others also argue for a more nuanced understanding, recognising the interplay between both an interest and an identity perspective. For example, de Bakker and de Hond (2008) point out that stakeholders may not be driven solely by a particular interest, nor by identity, leading to stakeholders targeting a firm for different reasons (interest or identify) at different points in time.

The temporal element is reflected in the work of Mitchell et al. (1997), who identify the constructs of power, legitimacy and urgency as relevant for understanding stakeholder mobilisation. Stakeholders can clearly act individually, but they usually lack the ability (power) to change corporate behaviour. Indirect strategies, such as coalitions formed between stakeholder groups (Neville & Menguc, 2006), may allow stakeholders to combine their power, legitimacy and urgency in a way that enhances their salience, defined by Mitchell et al. (1997, p.854) as 'the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholders' claims'. Increased salience can improve the bargaining position of a stakeholder coalition vis-à-vis firms (Laplume, et al., 2008, p.1163).

SPORTS STADIUM REGENERATION AND STAKEHOLDER MOBILISATION

Literature on community involvement in regeneration suggests it is not easy to balance wider community or stakeholder participation with successful developments (Henderson et al., 2007). It is also argued that regeneration agencies often limit participation to groups seen as legitimate, or most in tune with their objectives (Harvey & Schaefer, 2001); that it is difficult to find 'representative' community leaders; and that participation is often constrained by the belief of local people that they will not be listened to (Imrie & Raco, 2003; Jones, 2002). Common criticisms of urban regeneration, of whatever type, include a failure to consult, and then, importantly, to allow participation by local communities and stakeholders. This results in feelings that decisions are a *fait accompli*, with the local community only being consulted as a 'rubber-stamp' in the process.

In the context of sport-led regeneration, there are similar concerns around the lack of democratic or political representation. For example, although a number of public meetings were held prior to the construction of Vancouver's BC Place Stadium, these were primarily information sessions for the public and the community was prevented from gaining a vote in the process (Lee, 2002). Similarly, Jones' (2002) research on the Millennium Stadium development in Cardiff highlights how local structures serving democracy and accountability were inadequate, while more recent research on the development of the Emirates Stadium showed that the stakeholder management strategy employed by the football club and local council was clearly aimed at engaging stakeholders, rather than providing any opportunities for participation in the decision-making process (Walters, 2011).

Ignoring the local context could provide a trigger for local community stakeholders to take action through mobilisation (Colenutt and Cutten, 1994). This was a feature of the Sydney Olympic Games where protests and community meetings involving local resident groups and indigenous

people were held in the build up to the event (Nauright, 2004). However, mobilising efforts were not particularly successful in influencing decisions as ‘these voices were quickly silenced within Australian public debate’ (Nauright, 2004, p.1328). Similar findings have been shown in the context of the London Olympic site, where mobilising efforts against the compulsory purchase orders to relocate 201 small and medium enterprises and 425 residents of the Clays Lane Housing Estate were unsuccessful due to fragmentation (Fussey et al., 2012). Curi et al. (2011, p.151), however, provides some evidence of relative successes in mobilisation against developments proposed for the 2007 Pan American Games in Rio de Janeiro, but accepts that ‘if the civil society organization could avoid some interventions in public spaces, it was not strong enough to bring to the city a major legacy after the games’.

This body of research emphasises the critical role that the wider political and institutional context plays in stadium-led regeneration. This is particularly relevant in the context of the UK. Following a period in which local democracy and decentralisation were placed at the centre of Labour government policy (Rydin & Thornley, 2002), recession and changes in government policy post-2010 meant this went into reverse. Austerity measures have had a disproportionate impact on the urban environment (Meegan et al., 2014), while the economics of austerity have been used as a Trojan horse to hasten the neo-liberal drive towards privatisation (Dillon and Fanning, 2015; Pugalís, 2016). This is the case particularly in the context of urban regeneration in which pre-eminence is given to economic factors (Pugalís, 2016), evidenced in the Minister for Decentralisation and Cities’ Statement on Growth in March 2011 that called for local authorities to review existing section 106 agreements on schemes that were deemed financially unviable. This reflects a changed institutional context and a move back towards a decentralised marketplace, with the downgrading of democracy and community involvement in regeneration (Colenutt et al., 2015: 1).

These broader institutional changes are important when looking at stakeholder mobilisation, as democratic processes (or a lack of) can provide clear reasons why community stakeholder groups

may seek to mobilise. However, whilst many previous sport-related studies recognise the wider institutional context and the role it plays in alienating stakeholders, they also tend to describe specific issues, rather than looking at the factors that lead to stakeholder mobilisation, particularly in the context of community stakeholder mobilisation around stadium-led regeneration schemes.

METHODS

Case study background

This article focuses on a case study of the *Our Tottenham* community network. The network of over 50 community groups was formed in spring 2013 in response to regeneration plans for Tottenham. The stadium development at Tottenham Hotspur Football Club was the catalyst for the redevelopment and part of the Northumberland Development Project (NDP). It spans the period between the original planning application in 2010 and eventual approval of revised plans by Haringey Council in December 2015. The main focal organisations involved in this development were Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC. The *Our Tottenham* network of local community stakeholders sought to increase their participation in the process of stadium-led regeneration. This case represents an appropriate research site to better understand the antecedent factors that support the stakeholder mobilisation process.

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

Data collection

Data was collected between December 2012 and December 2015¹ using semi-structured interviews, participant observation of meetings and other events (table 1) and analysis of secondary material. The interviews were one-to-one and each lasted between 40 and 90 minutes. It was important to interview a diverse group of stakeholders to obtain rich detail and for the validity of the study. For this reason, the choice of interviewees was based on a purposive sampling technique. Following the guidelines for purposeful sampling in choosing the initial respondents (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), a snowball technique was used that involved asking those who were interviewed to recommend others who would provide relevant information for the study. It follows from the above that not all of the individuals or organisations that were involved in this research were identified at the start of the process. All individuals that participated in the research were granted anonymity, although some spoke publicly and on the record through various media formats.

The participant observation included meetings of the *Our Tottenham* network, meetings of Haringey Council, planning consultations in Tottenham, and public meetings of community groups, conferences and demonstrations and private and quasi-private meetings involving Tottenham Hotspur FC and a range of community group meetings in Tottenham. Apart from public meetings, such as those of the local council, the participation was overt and all groups were informed of the lead researcher's background and nature of the research. However, it was recognised that in using participant observation there are a number of threats to reliability and validity. The interviews and participant observation were triangulated with secondary data from a number of different sources, which included planning documents, newspaper reports, webcasts of local authority meetings, company annual reports, corporate communications, community publications and material from various social media formats such as on-line forums and blogs. The secondary data sources were used to categorise, investigate, interpret and identify limitations of the primary data. They also allowed for a richer picture than could be obtained from interviews and participant observation alone.

¹ One later interview was conducted on 12.07.17.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

Data analysis

The analysis of the data was undertaken in a systematic manner and the process is set out in diagrammatic form in figure 2. The coding process was iterative and started once the majority of the interviews and participant observations had been completed. Relevant concepts were identified, using the language of the respondents, and grouping direct quotations under different categories. This involved concepts linked to stakeholders' views as expressed in interviews and meetings that the lead researcher attended as a participant observer. The researchers did this independently and then together produced a set of 'first-order concepts' (Gioia et al., 2013), bringing together material that demonstrates similarities based on what the interviewees were saying. Following this, we grouped together the first order concepts into researcher-centric 'second-order themes' (Gioia et al., 2013). These themes provide more understanding and explanation of the reasons underpinning mobilisation. Some of these themes reflect previous research; others are novel and perhaps reflect the peculiarities of this particular case. Finally, we identified from these second-order themes a smaller number of 'aggregate dimensions'. These enabled us to build our data structure which helped us to construct the theoretical narrative around the antecedent factors that acted as triggers for stakeholders to mobilise through the *Our Tottenham* network. The four aggregate dimensions are used to structure the following findings section.

The main purpose of this research was to identify the antecedent factors underpinning stakeholder mobilisation in the context of stadium-led regeneration. It is recognised that conclusions drawn from this article are from a particular set of individuals, and also rest on the interpretations and constructions of the authors, and the results must be considered in this context. It is clearly difficult

to generalise to other community groups, reflecting the methodological challenges in undertaking interpretive, case study research. However, many of the features and processes relating to the mobilisation of the *Our Tottenham* network will share commonalities with other sites.

INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE

FINDINGS

The erosion of local democracy

The first factor to emerge from the analysis is ‘the erosion of local democracy’. There was a perception that the traditional decision-making processes of local government that should take local communities into account were being circumvented in order to accommodate developers to push through the stadium and the regeneration plans. This is in part linked to the earlier discussion on the economics of austerity as evidenced in the interviews. For example, one interviewee referred to the process as ‘corporate-led regeneration’ that had resulted in Haringey Council attempting to retain their influence but having to work with ‘...big players like property developers, outsourcing companies, private companies and so on and selling off services and assets and land’ (interview with Tom, Tottenham resident and community activist). This was recognised as a ‘London-wide issue where there’s these large-scale developments all over London and the needs of local communities are kind of secondary or just ignored completely’ (interview with Alan, Tottenham resident and community activist).

This erosion of local democracy was perceived in two ways. First, the view of many community stakeholders was that there was a failure to consult by both the football club and Haringey Council regarding the new stadium and the associated developments. For example, there was a prevailing

view amongst private property owners that 'The High Road West community was never consulted over the demolition of their local shops and businesses' (interview with Nic, local business owner, Tottenham). Similarly, in a meeting between Tottenham Traders and Haringey Council it was said that 'There has been no engagement with local business about the development of this regeneration plan. We have been lied to and lied to by our own elected representatives. The key decisions for this master plan were made long before the consultation' (Gilmaz, leading a deputation of Tottenham Traders to Haringey Council meeting, November 2013).

The second example of the erosion of local democracy was that where consultation had taken place, it was perceived not to be genuine and that the consultations were in effect 'a sham'. As one interviewee stated, 'Now there's all kinds of supposed consultations imperatives, but the trouble is they don't actually take any notice of what people say if it conflicts with the council and the developers what they want to do' (Interview with Tom, Tottenham resident and community activist). Equally, one interviewee stated that 'They don't understand that consultation doesn't mean telling people what you've done after you've decided to do it' (interview with John, supporter of THFC and Journalist). For example, the only way that many in the local community became aware of Haringey Council's High Road West regeneration plans, linked to the new stadium development, was through community meetings, leaflets, word of mouth and the local media: 'So I went in to the library on Saturday and got Turkish copies and photo-copied the hell out of them and started distributing them and told them to tell everyone..... So this is why we're trying to let people know, to use their voice, disagree' (Interview with Lara, resident and business owner, Tottenham).

The perceived 'sham' consultation, and the fact that the local community had to step in to inform others of planned developments, provoked discontent and anger amongst communities in Tottenham, which in turn acted as a mechanism for mobilisation: 'All over Tottenham people are challenging different aspects, different projects, different sites that are under threat, proposing

alternatives, defending existing set-ups' (Interview with Tom, Tottenham resident and community activist). One resident specifically credited the council's 'rhetoric' about consultations with encouraging the formation of groups such as *Our Tottenham* and much of the resulting dissent and protest: 'They spout rhetoric and pay lip service to local consultations in such an obvious patronising way that they have created and encouraged the formation of the *Our Tottenham* movement that is growing and growing' (local resident, Tottenham, participant observation in community meeting, July 2013). Ultimately, the creation of the *Our Tottenham* network drew on the anger and discontent brought about by the erosion of local democracy to encourage community groups to mobilise.

A Violation of Reciprocity

The second factor underpinning mobilisation was the violation of reciprocity between the focal organisations, Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC, and the local community. This related firstly to the lack of transparency around both the development plans and the focal organisations. This included a lack of access to council documents, the representation of local views, viability reports that were not made public, the work of groups such the Tottenham Landowners and Major Businesses Group, and the relationship between Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC. 'I've never seen anything so diseased and secret. It's almost as if we are working for Spurs' (interview with Peter ex-local councillor, Haringey). Additionally:

'What really pisses me off is the secrecy. I got an offer to view a document, but on the basis of secrecy. I said what needs to happen is all of it should be in the public domain so people can see what's going on. I was offered a meeting, but it would be private and confidential' (Haringey, participant observation in meeting, July 2013).

Alongside the lack of transparency, there were clear concerns amongst business owners in particular that underhand tactics were being used by the council and the football club. Whilst this was manifest through very strong feelings, 'Tottenham are basically blackmailing the council' (Interview with local business owner, Franco, Tottenham), one local business owner explained how she was offered the opportunity to sell her business in 2009 at below the market rate:

'So they came along and they made a lot of offers that were ridiculous. I think they viewed the shop as not very important and probably thought they could buy it for under market value. So my agent wrote to them and said this was ridiculous, it's not even half the value. And the guy wrote back: 'it's only a minor advantage to us to get the shop early. We will be able to obtain it with CPOs later anyway' (Interview with Paula, local business owner, Tottenham).

The use of CPOs (compulsory purchase orders) as a threat to obtain ownership at a later date in order to knock down and rebuild can be argued to be an example of an underhand tactic designed to pressurise business owners into selling. This provoked a response amongst business owners: 'Do you agree this is injustice? Then please take action and support us by writing to your ward councillors and any prospective candidates to ask them to oppose these demolition plans' (Tottenham Business Group, 2014). At the same time, the underhand way in which the football club and local authority had dealt with the threat of demolition created anger. As one interview revealed: 'What, you're going to knock those down'? We're not having that. And it's almost that you *cause* people to dig their heels in' (interview with Mick, THFC supporter). This was further evidenced in a petition against the High Road West plans to Haringey Council: 'More than 1,800 people from the N17 area alone signed our petition... 20 times the figure used by the council as a mandate to demolish' (stated in community meeting in Tottenham, September, 2013). These examples show that the underhand tactics also provoke anger and act as a mechanism for mobilising.

One particularly contentious issue was the council's decision to revise the original planning agreement to reduce Tottenham Hotspur FC's Section 106 community infrastructure payments from over £16 million to just £477,000 and release it from a 50% affordable housing requirement for property built on the existing football ground; at the time, the football club was negotiating to sell a player for 100 million Euros. These examples helped to fuel the perception that the football club and the council were acting together in an underhand manner and coupled with the perceived lack of transparency, led to the feeling that the local community stakeholders were not being treated fairly. As such, the perception of unfair treatment through these two constructs suggests that the norms of reciprocity were being violated and this is the second factor underpinning the mobilisation of the *Our Tottenham* network.

Protecting community interests

The third factor underpinning the mobilisation of the *Our Tottenham* network was the protection of community interests. Concerns around social engineering and gentrification support this. Local residents and business owners in Tottenham expressed views in meetings that 'it's not regeneration, that's social engineering', and that 'social cleansing' and 'gentrification' were taking place around them as part of the wider regeneration linked to the new stadium. One individual at a street assembly (observation, July 2013) described the new stadium as a 'Trojan horse for gentrification', while one interviewee stated that 'The plans delivered won't be for present residents, for people who presently live here. It will be for a socially cleansed area. It will be. We know that' (Interview with Lara, local resident and business owner). This view was also seen in a webcast of the meeting of the Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council in November 2013, where Councillor Bull stated:

‘But you don't have to be close to the detail of the stadium plans or the wider place-changing agenda to be alarmed by what is proposed. Simply knowing that the plan involves bulldozing through shops on the High Road, council homes on the Love Lane Estate, and demolishing a public library for a fans’ walkway tells you all you need to know about its social cleansing drive’.

Further evidence to support this could be seen in the reneging on the original section 106 community infrastructure commitments that had been included in the initial approval granted by Haringey Council’s Planning Committee in 2010 (mentioned above). Following the riots that occurred in Tottenham in the summer of 2011, the Mayor of London announced in January 2012 over £41 million in funding and investment for the area. Linked to this new funding package, in February 2012 the Planning Committee of Haringey Council agreed significant changes to reduce the cost and increase the realisable value of the stadium development. This largely involved reducing the football club’s funding obligations from £16 million to £477,000 and allowing an increase in the number of residencies to be built on the existing ground to 285 (up from 200, but the eventual figure agreed was 585 in December 2015), all of which would be sold on the open market.

In community and council meetings, council representatives were very keen for phrases such as ‘social engineering’ and ‘social cleansing’ not to become part of the discourse linked with regeneration in Tottenham. Many local people also believed, perhaps correctly given the institutional context outlined above, that large landowners generally had greater influence at the local council than other stakeholders such as local residents and the owners of smaller businesses were excluded from participation in the regeneration plans (personal interviews with the author). The context of perceived negative social and community impacts that local stakeholders in Tottenham felt, including fear and stress for their own futures, provided a strong trigger for the mobilisation of the *Our Tottenham* network in order to protect their interests: ‘We say this to Tottenham residents: Beware!

We are at the forefront of this process. Your turn is coming next. Get involved now, be aware that area plans are already made, and question everything in this process' (leaflet from *Our Tottenham*, 2013).

There was also the desire for the community to be part of the regeneration rather than a top-down process dominated by property development interests. This was explicitly demonstrated by the fact that the *Our Tottenham* network put forward their own 'Community Plan for Tottenham' partly in response to Haringey Council's 'Plan for Tottenham' that many felt did not take into account the views of the local community. These concerns led to the mobilisation of the *Our Tottenham* network to protect community interests.

Increasing salience

The fourth factor underpinning the mobilisation of stakeholders in the *Our Tottenham* network was the perceived lack of salience felt by community stakeholders. For many of the residents and business owners that lived and worked across the road from the existing stadium, the realisation of their lack of individual power came from the High Road West consultation in spring 2013. The consultation included major plans for demolition of social housing as well as private homes and businesses on the opposite side of Tottenham High Road to the proposed new stadium: 'They can't just take our factory and our land, which we have built over so many years' work, to build flats to make money; surely that is theft?' (interview with Nic, local business owner, Tottenham). It was also decided by the council that a petition containing over four thousand names that was gathered together by local businesses and residents could not form part of the formal consultation process, providing further evidence of the community's lack of power: 'We are people that contribute greatly to the community, but we are being pushed out of the area we were born and raised in, Tottenham, and punished for not fitting in with the new plans' (interview with Lara, local resident and business owner).

Similarly, one interviewee stated that 'It just seems like private discussions are going on in the world of high finance and we're not really going to have much influence over it' (interview with Paula Tottenham resident and business owner).

The realisation of their lack of individual power led stakeholders to recognise the need to mobilise in order to try to influence the development and thus this was another factor underpinning the formation of the *Our Tottenham* network. There was an understanding that individuals, and individual groups, could not challenge such a major strategy on their own: 'I think that any person that takes on big organisations needs to be in a group. It doesn't matter how strong, smart, savvy, knowledgeable you are, you cannot do it on your own' (interview with Mia, local resident, and community activist). This was also recognised in an interview with a local councillor, Ali, who argued that 'you can't just have different individuals springing up from everywhere and saying I represent that group and I represent that group whereas it's just themselves with one or two concerns. So you have to have established groups'.

DISCUSSION

The preceding case study of the *Our Tottenham* network identifies four factors that provide a stronger theoretical understanding of the conditions that prompt community stakeholders to mobilise around a stadium-led regeneration scheme. We categorise these as either reactive or proactive (figure 3).

Reactive factors: (i) the erosion of local democracy and (ii) violation of reciprocity

The first two factors emerged due to the perceived behaviour of Haringey Council and the football club towards local communities in Tottenham. The interviews and observations revealed that

the failure to take into account local communities in regard to the stadium development and the broader regeneration of Tottenham was perceived as an erosion of local democracy. This was felt through a failure to consult by both the football club and Haringey Council and that any consultations were a 'sham'. In part, it can be argued that this was linked to the cuts faced by Haringey Council as a result of austerity that was allowing private development companies to move into the space once occupied by the public sector (Deas and Doyle, 2013). However, the use of sport mega-events to implement economic projects that interfere with public space for private advantage has been noted elsewhere (Curi et al., 2011). Expressions such as 'it's a completely fraudulent consultation', related to the High Road West plans, evidence the strong emotions that were undoubtedly drivers towards mobilisation for some in Tottenham.

At the same time, there were concerns that the focal organisations' behaviour was in violation of the norms of reciprocity (Hayibor and Collins, 2016). In this case, this dimension was made up of a perceived lack of transparency and underhand tactics. This echoes research that has looked at the governance of regeneration projects linked to sports such as the Olympic Stadium in London, which has been criticised for being opaque and lacking democratic controls (Minton, 2012) together with the Pan American Games in Rio in 2007 where a lack of transparency was a constant problem (Curi et al., 2011). In Tottenham we had clear views that the regeneration process was 'diseased and secret' and this was clearly a motivating factor for some people to mobilise. The notion of the local community as the beneficiary in such circumstances becomes a highly contested entity (Fussey et al., 2012: 279).

These two antecedent factors were created by the actions of the focal organisations and had a direct mobilising effect on local community stakeholders. They are past and present focused, and, as such, figure 3 sets out how these two factors are categorised as reactive in that stakeholder mobilisation through the *Our Tottenham* network occurred as a response, or reaction, to the perceived behaviour of these organisations.

INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE

Proactive factors: (iii) protecting community interests and (iv) increasing salience

King (2008) argues that dissatisfaction amongst community stakeholder groups does not automatically mean that mobilisation will occur or that a salient stakeholder group will emerge. In this sense, the reactive factors by themselves might not be enough for mobilisation to occur. The two additional factors that emerged from the research: the protection of community interest and the increase in salience – contrast to the previous two in that these were not a direct, immediate response to the behaviour of the football club and Haringey council.

The protection of community interests reflected strongly held views that social engineering and gentrification were taking place in Tottenham and as result of this there was a need to put forward community-led development plans. The exclusion of competing groups linked to stadium-building has been found in previous research (Collins, 2008; Lee, 2002), although not explicitly linked to mobilisation. The need for decision-making by community, resident, supporter and business representatives for successful stadium-led developments has also been argued by Brown et al (2004). However, Fussey et al., (2012: 265) note the long history of ‘cleansing’ and ‘purifying’ strategies in urban management. The feeling that the stadium-led regeneration plans were not for the existing community, but for a ‘socially cleansed area’, were again strong drivers towards mobilisation for many local people in Tottenham.

The need to mobilise to develop increased salience reflects ways in which community interests were given attention, or perceived to be ignored. There was a realisation of the lack of individual power and therefore of the need to work together. There is evidence here that people

recognised the need for dense stakeholder networks that can facilitate the formation of coalitions (Rowley, 1997). Relative successes in defeating some aspects of sport-led regeneration projects as far apart as Rio (Curi et al., 2011) and Edinburgh (Reid, 2014) have been linked with sometimes loosely tied coalitions that are able to mobilise around 'problematic interventions in the city's landscapes' (Curi et al., 2011: 148). Thus, the sporting element of any regeneration can provide the interest intensity necessary for effective mobilisation. Those affected by potential demolition of their homes or businesses by developments linked to the building of the new stadium in Tottenham particularly found it hard to understand their lack of salience. In those circumstances these individuals looked to mobilise together in groups such as *Our Tottenham*. These dimensions are also not past or present focused, but are future focused and are categorised as proactive in that the community stakeholders recognised the need to mobilise (and formalise) to ensure there was a mechanism through which the various community stakeholders could put forward changes for the future benefit of the community.

Implications

These four factors are not mutually exclusive. For example, the erosion of local democracy (a reactive, past/present force) is very much linked to the protection of community interests, which is proactive and future focused. Therefore there are clear relationships between these factors and they are interlinked. In the context of this particular case study, we argue that mobilising efforts occurred due to the strong presence of both reactive and proactive forces. Reactive forces helped to underpin mobilising efforts through engendering a feeling of anger amongst stakeholders and serve to create an 'us versus them' situation. This anger was then channelled through proactive processes that served to give focus to the development of forward thinking approaches that seek to address community stakeholder needs. Together, these forces played an important role in mobilising efforts. It could be argued that without both forces present, the mobilisation of the *Our Tottenham* network may not have occurred. This finding has implications for community stakeholders seeking to mobilise to act

against a firm. If there is not significant community anger due to perceived violations of reciprocity and concerns around the erosion of local democracy, then it may be difficult for community groups to mobilise sufficiently to achieve greater salience. Community stakeholder mobilisation is therefore dependent on the recognition of the past and present behaviour of a focal organisation, but to achieve salience, it also requires forward thinking approaches and strategies that recognise the future objectives and goals of the community.

This finding also has implications for focal organisations in the context of stadium-led regeneration. They need to recognise how their behaviour can create the conditions for stakeholder mobilisation against the firm through reactive measures. As such, it provides an instrumental justification for the focal organisation to ensure that they take local community stakeholders into account during stadium regeneration through the implementation of governance structures that allow for involvement in decision-making by communities and that ensure there is regular information sharing about the stadium development. Engaging local communities and involving them in the development would make it less likely that people would feel that reciprocity had been violated or local democracy undermined; as a result it is less likely to lead to reactive forces being present, which in turn may inhibit mobilising efforts to act against a focal organisation. At the same time, however, there is also a more important normative, or moral reasoning, underpinning the decision to engage community stakeholders in stadium regeneration. It can be argued that implementing democratic structures is necessary to ensure that the views of local community stakeholders are heard and to demonstrate that there are clear efforts to ensure accountability towards those affected.

The reactive and proactive antecedent conditions underpinning this model relate to the interest aspect of stakeholder mobilisation. However, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) argued that the interest focused perspective cannot offer a complete picture given that it does not account for why some stakeholder groups will pursue a lost cause or engage in action when there is little prospect of

them achieving benefits. Despite the recognition of the role of social identity and the concept of an imagined community (Blakeley & Evans, 2009), there was little to suggest that the mobilisation of the *Our Tottenham* network occurred for these reasons. However, this could be due to the specificities of the case and in particular, the fact that mobilisation occurred in part as a reaction to focal organisation behaviour (creating the 'us versus them' situation) perhaps could be a reason as to why social identity did not play a role in mobilising. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that mobilisation is an ongoing process; it does not simply end when the network has formed as mobilising efforts continue (i.e. through reaching out to other stakeholder groups in order to increase salience).

It could be argued however, that whilst the network formed due to interest intensity, the sustainability of this network is now related to interest intensity *and* to social identity. For example, it was stated that 'The only good thing to come from this consultation is that the community has become a bit closer, but we're all still worried' (interview with Paula, local resident and business owner, Tottenham). This suggests there are now social identity processes at play following the mobilisation of the *Our Tottenham* network. This aligns with the argument of de Bakker and de Hond (2008) who suggest that stakeholders may target a firm for different reasons (interest or identity) at different points in time. We would suggest that in the context of the *Our Tottenham* network, mobilisation occurred for interest reasons and that moving forward, a sense of social identity also comes into play. However, this is an area for further research. In a related example, unintended but positive effects have been found in Rio, resulting from development related to the 2016 Olympic Games. As journalist Julia Michaels states, 'The positive legacies aren't any of the ones that were stated or intended ... but civil society is more networked, more aware. People in favelas are angry. I think the poor started to change the way they view themselves'. This has led to a sense of empowerment and that those living in favelas are not as easily 'pushed to the side' (Michaels, in Purcell, 2017). The findings from this case study of the *Our Tottenham* network are similar; the mobilising efforts have increased the

community's awareness, willingness and capability to act against future regeneration developments undertaken by Haringey council.

CONCLUSION

This is one of the first articles to undertake empirical research focusing on the factors that underpin stakeholder mobilisation in the context of sport stadium-led regeneration. It builds on the earlier analysis of civic campaigns around sporting mega-events (Cornelissen, 2012, Curi et al., 2011) but, more importantly, provides a greater understanding of the antecedent factors as to why community stakeholders mobilise, how they come together and the extent of their influence. The reactive and proactive categorisations explain in a more theoretically informed way the nature of the conditions that 'predispose stakeholders to act against firms' (Hayibor and Collins, 2016, p351) and how they can be used by community groups to build a salient stakeholder coalition. The findings also demonstrate the importance that 'interest intensity' plays in mobilisation (Rowley & Moldovaneau, 2003), although the longer-term sustainability of this network relates to interest intensity *and* to social identity. Further research on the mobilisation of community networks could provide more understanding of whether these findings are present in other contexts that would aid their transferability. Moreover, there is a need for a better understanding as to the types of strategies and tactics used by community groups once mobilised in order to seek influence on focal organisations.

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Figure 1: Research Timeline




Figure 2: Data structure




Figure 3: Antecedent factors underpinning community stakeholder mobilisation




Table 1: Data Sources

Interviews (14 interviews)	Observations (28 full meetings)
Local councillors, London borough of Haringey (4 separate interviews) Local business owners (4 separate interviews) Local resident and community activists (3 separate interviews) Education consultant Parliamentary assistant Supporter of THFC and Journalist	Community group, Tottenham (18 meetings) Business group, Tottenham(2 meetings) Planning consultation, Tottenham Street assembly, Tottenham Street rally, outside Haringey Council meeting Meeting of Haringey Council full cabinet Community conference, Tottenham THFC 'fun day' THFC v CPFC community street assembly Haringey Council Planning sub-committee